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Abstract
What kind of candidate is selected into a job when the principal has to appoint a
committee to measure the candidate's ability and select a winner through a call specifying
a wage for the job? In a model where the principal ﬁxes the wage anticipating the
committee's choice, under a rather natural assumption about the committee's objective
we ﬁnd that if the committee takes into account the candidate's gratitude a candidate
with less than ﬁrst best ability will be selected in equilibrium. First best selection is
achieved if the committee is anonymous to the candidates. If the committee could also
set the wage the ﬁrst best candidate would be selected, but the principal would be worse
oﬀ hence he would not implement full delegation.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72; D02; M51
Keywords: Principal-agent model; Selection of job candidates; Gratitude and reci-
procity
1 Introduction
On moral grounds gratitude is certainly a good thing. For Cicero being and appearing
grateful [...] is not only the greatest, but is also the parent of all the other virtues. 1 To some
extent the instinct to reciprocate which it implies seems deeply rooted in human nature, as is
well recognized in formal game theory since Rabin (1993) and conﬁrmed in experiments and
data.2 Diverse experiments have found in particular that candidates selected for a job show
deﬁnite signs of thankfulness towards the selectors,3 and the data analyzed by Baron (2013)
suggest that gratitude is higher on the part of low performers. Now suppose the selecting
∗University of Palermo, Italy.
1As translated at the University of Chicago, see http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-
cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=LatinAugust2012&getid=1&query=Cic.%20Planc.%2080#80
2The theoretical literature includes Levine (1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Falk and Fischbacher
(2006), Levine et al. (2010). Experiments are carried out by Fehr et al (1993), Fehr et al (1997), Ben-Ner et
al (2004). Empirical ﬁndings are contained in Baron (2013), Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011).
3Fehr et al (1993), Maggian et al. (2015), Montinari et al. (2016)
1
committee may anticipate that the selected candidate will be grateful towards them; and
consider a situation where this committee has been appointed by a principal who is unable
to carry out the selection procedure but who is ultimately the one for whom the candidate
will work and is also the one who will pay her. This situation is common in the public sector
but it is just as relevant in career advancements within ﬁrms.4 Suppose in particular that
the principal sets a wage for the job and the committee then selects a candidate. What wage
will the principal set, and what type of candidate will be selected? Will the equilibrium diﬀer
from a suitably deﬁned ﬁrst best outcome, and if so how depending on whether the committee
takes the candidate's gratitude into account?
In the model we study the outcome is always the ﬁrst best if the committee does not
take into account the candidate's gratitude - as is necessarily the case when the committee is
anonymous to the candidate. If the committee's choice is also determined by the candidate's
gratitude the intuition is that since given the wage this gratitude is higher the lower is reser-
vation utility there may be a tendency towards selection of candidates with lower than ﬁrst
best ability. The model we analyze strongly conﬁrms this presumption.
We also ask what would happen if the committee is given the power to choose the wage
as well as the candidate. In this case we show that the ﬁrst best candidate would be chosen,
but that the principal would be worse oﬀ than under partial delegation - hence he will retain
the power to set the wage whenever he can, even though this is worse from a welfare point of
view.
2 Model structure
There are a principal and a continuum of candidates indexed by ability 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Candidate
θ has on-the-job productivity s(θ) strictly increasing concave and reservation utility u(θ)
strictly increasing convex with u′(0) = 0. Concavity of s − u is assumed to be strict. We
assume s(0) = u(0) = 0 and s(θ) ≥ u(θ) for all θ.
The candidate is to be selected through a call for the job at wage w and relative selection
procedure which selects a candidate among applicants, namely those with u(θ) ≤ w.
Suppose ﬁrst the principal is able to measure θ through a selection procedure. Then since
candidate θ must be paid at least u(θ) the principal's desired candidate will be the argmax
0 < θfb ≤ 1 of the diﬀerence s(θ) − u(θ);5 he will then set wage wfb such that u(θfb) = wfb ;
and will issue a call for the job at this wage. All θ with u(θ) ≤ wfb apply, and the principal
will be able to select the desired ﬁrst best θfb .
If the principal cannot measure θ directly, then he will have to appoint a committee with
that capacity (we are assuming it exists) to select a candidate after setting a wage w for the
4In the latter context an early paper based on this premise is Prendergast and Topel (1996).
5The ﬁrst best θfb cannot be zero since s′(0)− u′(0) > 0.
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position. At the end of the selection phase the principal observes the candidate θc chosen by
the committee; if s(θc) ≥ w he accepts it, otherwise he rejects it and everyone gets zero.6
In choosing the wage the principal will anticipate the committee's choice, that is, denoting
by θc(w) the committee's choice as a function of wage, the principal will choose w to maximize
s(θc(w))−w. We will denote the principal's optimal choice by wp so that the selected candidate
in equilibrium is θc(wp).
Given w the committee is appointed to select a candidate θ. If s(θ) < w the candidate will
be rejected and everyone gets zero. Otherwise the committee chooses a θ which the principal
will accept, that is such that s(θ) ≥ w. Since applying candidates are only those with
u(θ) ≤ w the committee will also have to choose θ satisfying this constraint. Deﬁne θmin(w)
as the minimal acceptable θ which is determined by s(θ) = w, that is θmin(w) = s−1(w).
Similarly θmax(w) is deﬁned as the θ of the highest applicant at w; for w ≤ u(1) this is the
θ deﬁned by u(θ) = w, but for w > u(1) all will apply and the highest will have u(θ) < w;
thus we deﬁne θmax(w) = min{u−1(w); 1}.7 Then the committee's feasibility constraint for
an acceptable candidate is then θmin(w) ≤ θ ≤ θmax(w). We specify the committee's problem
and examine the relative choice in the next section.
Observe that the model is not well behaved if the committee's choice θc(w) is decreasing
in the wage. Indeed if this is the case the principal's payoﬀ unambiguously decreases in w
hence the optimum is at wp = 0; but the only feasible choice at that wage is θ = 0. We will
check that the committee's choice is increasing below.
Remark. One may wonder whether the principal can oﬀer the committee a transfer in exchange
for the sure selection of a desired candidate. Indeed it is easy to check that the principal would
be willing to oﬀer the full amount wp − u(θc(wp)) to the committee in exchange for selection
of θfb . The problem is that, if the principal cannot commit ex-ante to reject any candidate
diﬀerent from θfb, this is not incentive compatible: the committee would behave as before,
ignoring the transfer.
3 Committee's choice and equilibrium
First observe that the committee might have the same objective as that of a principal capable
of measuring θ, that is to maximize s(θ) − u(θ). In this case a principal anticipating the
committee's choice would set w = wfb , for then the committee would choose θfb - which
6We are assuming that the principal cannot condition acceptance on productivity. Otherwise he could just
write a contract whereby whoever wishes to may be enrolled for the job at wage wfb provided s will be not
smaller than s(θfb); in that case the only applying candidate would be θfb and nothing else is needed. Inability
to commit implies that the principal will only reject candidates with s(θ) < w.
7For θmin(w) the analysis can be restricted to w ≤ s(1) because the principal would never choose to pay
more than the productivity of the highest candidate. Note also that if u(1) ≤ s(1) is satisﬁed with equality
then since it must be w ≤ s(θ) ≤ s(1) = u(1) then θmax(w) is always deﬁned by u(θ) = w.
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would be feasible since by deﬁnition wfb = u(θfb) ≤ u(1) whence θmax(wfb) = u−1(wfb) = θfb .
We start by putting on record a couple of simple points related to this observation:
Proposition 1. If the committee's objective is to maximize the net social beneﬁt s(θ)− u(θ)
then the principal will set wp = wfb and the committee will choose candidate θc(wp) = θfb.
The outcome is the same if given w the committee maximizes the principal's payoﬀ s(θ)−w.
More generally, the ﬁrst best candidate will be selected whenever the committee's choice is
θmax(w) for all w.
Proof. The ﬁrst has already been proven. With objective s(θ)− w the committee's choice is
θmax(w), so as before by setting w = wfb the principal induces the ﬁrst best outcome θfb (again
wfb = u(θfb) ≤ u(1) whence θmax(wfb) = θfb). For the last assertion: we have just proved
that when the committee's choice is θmax(w) the ﬁrst best is induced by setting w = wfb .
Note that in these cases the rent of the selected candidate w− u(θ) is zero. Now it might
be that if the selected candidate's rent were positive the committee would beneﬁt too, the
argument being that the candidate would be grateful to the committee and may be willing
to reciprocate at least to some extent - something that the committee will not fail to realize.
Of course this cannot happen if the committee is anonymous to the candidate; in this case
it would be natural to assume that the committee maximizes the principal's payoﬀ s − w
and as the stated result says the equilibrium outcome will be the ﬁrst best. In other words,
under anonymity the ﬁrst best is guaranteed. But if on the contrary the committee is known
to the candidates then the committee may have an interest in the candidate rent w − u(θ) -
and crucially this rent increases as the candidate becomes weaker. At the very extreme the
committee may value this rent only and choose the candidate θmin(w) - which would leave
the principal with zero payoﬀ - but more realistically one may presume that the committee
will also take into account the principal's payoﬀ s(θ) − w to some extent. What happens in
this case, that is if the committee maximizes some smooth function V (w − u(θ), s(θ) − w)
increasing in both arguments? The answer is the following, where subscripts denote partial
derivatives:
Proposition 2. Assume Vi > 0, Vii ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2 and the boundary conditions lim(V1/V2)w−u→0 =
∞, lim(V1/V2)s−w→0 = 0. If Vij > 0, then whenever 0 < θfb < 1 the equilibrium choice is
lower than ﬁrst best: θc(wp) < θfb.8
Proof. We shall show that at any w such that θc(w) ≥ θfb the principal's marginal payoﬀ at
w is strictly negative, which implies the result. The derivative of the committee's payoﬀ is
dV/dθ = −V1u′ + V2s′.
8As will be clear from the proof it is suﬃcient that any one of Vii ≤ 0 and Vij ≥ 0 be strict.
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If s(1) = u(1) then w ≤ u(1) hence s(θmin(w)) = w and u(θmax(w)) = w so that the
boundary conditions imply that the optimal choice θc(w) is interior; then θc(w) satisﬁes the
ﬁrst order condition V1u





′ + V22s′ − V12(u′ + s′)
V11(u′)2 + V22(s′)2 − 2s′u′V12 − V1u′′ + V2s′′ > 0
where the sign follows because both numerator and denominator are negative under the
maintained assumptions. Now take w such that θc(w) ≥ θfb; we show that the derivative of
the principal's payoﬀ s(θc(w))−w is negative. At any such θ it is s′ ≤ u′ so s′[V12(u′ + s′)−
V11u





s′[V12(u′ + s′)− V11u′ − V22s′]
2V12s′u′ − V11u′2 − V22s′2 + V1u′′ − V2s′′
≤ 2V12s
′u′ − V11u′2 − V22s′2
2V12s′u′ − V11u′2 − V22s′2 + (V1u′′ − V2s′′) < 1
as was to be shown.
Suppose now s(1) > u(1). As w ↑ s(1), for θ = 1 we have dV/dθ → V2s′ > 0 hence there
is a threshold w˜ > u(1) - deﬁned by dV (w˜ − u(1), s(1) − w˜)/dθ = 0 - such that for w > w˜
the committee chooses θc(w) = 1 and dV/dθ > 0 at θc(w). But the principal would never
choose a w > w˜ as that would entail a lower payoﬀ than w˜. Therefore wc ≤ w˜, dV/dθ = 0 at
θc(wc) and the above argument holds, where derivatives at w˜ are taken to be left derivatives
(s′(1) < u′(1) by the assumption θfb < 1).
The complementarity condition V12 > 0 says that if s − w is higher a marginal drop in
w−u hurts more. Under this condition, if the ﬁrst best θfb is interior the selected candidate's
ability is unambiguously lower than ﬁrst best - no matter how little the committee is interested
in w − u. A notable example satisfying the stated assumptions is the Cobb-Douglas family
V (w − u, s− w) = (w − u)α(s− w)β with 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1.10
The case of homothetic V delivers a simple intuition behind the result. In this case
V1/V2 = F ((w − u)/(s− w)) so that the committee's ﬁrst order condition V1u′ = V2s′ can be
written as (s−w)F−1(s′/u′) = (w−u); this implies that the principal's payoﬀ s(θc(w))−w =
µ(w)[s(θc(w))−u(θc(w))], where µ(w) = 1/(1+F−1(s′/u′)) is the share of the surplus that the
principal obtains in equilibrium; and it can be checked that µ is decreasing.11 The principal's
9The assumptions imply that the objective function of the committee is strictly concave. Indeed, d2V/dθ2 =
−V1u′′+V2s′′+V11 (u′)2−2V12u′s′+V22(s′)2 < 0, so the ﬁrst order condition is also suﬃcient for a maximum.
10The reader may notice that in the multiplicative caseα = β = 1 we get V1 = 0 when θ = θ
min and V2 = 0
when θ = θmax. The result above goes through because at no point can they be both null.
11Indeed, for any x, y > 0 it is deﬁned by V1(x, y)/V2(x, y) = F (x/y). Diﬀerentiating both sides with
respect to x gives (V11V2 − V12V1) /V 22 = F ′x and thus F ′ < 0 by our assumptions on V . By our maintained
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marginal gain is thus µ(s′− u′)θc ′+ (s− u)µ′ and at ﬁrst best s′− u′ = 0; hence what drives
the result is that lowering w leaves surplus unchanged but raises the principal's share.
The theorem is silent on the case θfb = 1, because in that case the equilibrium may as
well be θc(wp) = θfb; by inspecting the proof this is seen to be the case when s′(1) − u′(1)
is large enough. The two cases - θfb < 1 and θfb = 1 - correspond to diﬀerent economic
contexts. In the case of θfb = 1 the principal is willing to pay the reservation wage of even
the very best types - we may think of top sport teams or universities or more generally
ﬁrms with a high product value. In this case selection via a committee may not lead to
distortions. The case of interior ﬁrst best applies on the other hand to situations where the
productivity of the candidate in the principal's concern is lower - second division teams or
lower-tier universities - so that the principal ﬁnds it optimal to exploit the more abundant
supply of average individuals for whom owing to competition the reservation wage is lower
relative to their productivity. In this case, which in the end is more typical, delegation to
a committee that will proﬁt from the candidate's rent distorts the outcome unambiguously
towards employing less than ﬁrst best candidates.
A function which does not fall in the class covered by Proposition 2 is the convex combi-
nation
V (w − u, s− w) = γ · [s(θ)− w] + (1− γ) · [w − u(θ)]
with 0 < γ < 1. All the second derivatives are zero, and depending on γ the boundary
conditions may also fail. We next ask what happens in this case - but notice that here the
committee's choice does not depend on w, a feature which makes this formulation somewhat
unappealing.
Proposition 3. Assume V = γ · (s−w) + (1− γ) · (w− u). If γ < 1/2 one has θc(wp) < θfb
while if γ ≥ 1/2 equilibrium is θfb; in all these equilibria w − u is zero.
Proof. In this case dV/dθ = γs′ − (1 − γ)u′ ∝ γ1−γ s′ − u′. We know that this is positive at
θ = 0 (since u′(0) = 0 and s′(0) > 0) so the unconstrained maximum, say θγ , of V is positive.
Recall that at θfb it is u′ = s′, and that wfb is deﬁned by u(θfb) = wfb so that θmax(wfb) = θfb .
If γ ≥ 1/2 then dV/dθ > 0 for all θ < θfb so θγ ≥ θfb. In this case equilibrium has wp = wfb
and θc(wp) = θmax(wp) = θfb so that indeed w − u = 0. The argument is this: for all w such
that θmax(w) ≤ θγ the committee chooses θmax(w) so since θγ ≥ θfb its optimal choice at
wp = wfb is θmax(wp) which is θfb ; to show that the principal does not want to deviate observe
at the given proﬁle he gets s(θfb)−wp = s(θfb)− u(θfb). For w < wfb and for w > wfb such
that θmax(w) ≤ θγ his payoﬀ is s(θmax(w))−w = s(θmax(w))−u(θmax(w)) ≤ s(θfb)−u(θfb);
assumption s′/u′ is strictly decreasing and θc is strictly increasing. Thus F−1(s′/u′) is increasing in w and µ
decreasing.
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for w > wfb such that θmax(w) > θγ the committee would choose θγ so the principal would
get s(θγ)−w < s(θγ)−(θmax)−1(θγ) = s(θγ)−u(θγ) which is again lower than s(θfb)−u(θfb).
Consider now γ < 1/2. In this case θγ < θfb and equilibrium has wp such that θmax(wp) =
θγ = θc(wp) so that indeed θc(wp) < θfb and the committee's rent is zero. Again, given
wp the committee's choice is clear. As to the principal, in the proposed equilibrium he gets
s(θγ)− u(θγ); a higher wage does not change the committee's choice and lowers his payoﬀ; a
lower wage forces the committee to choose θc = θmax(w) < θγ < θfb so the principal would
get s(θc)− u(θc) < s(θγ)− u(θγ) because for θ < θfb the function s− u is increasing.
Thus with convex combination V if the committee's incentives are suﬃciently aligned with
the principal's (precisely γ ≥ 1/2) then the ﬁrst best candidate is selected. Notice however
that this equilibrium involves a corner solution on the part of the committee.
Remark. The committee's preferences on x and y may be interpreted as reﬂecting the com-
mittee's attitude towards fairness in the allocation of beneﬁts between itself and the principal.
Consider then the pioneering formulation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which in the present
context is given by
V (w − u, s− w) = w − u− α ·max{s− w − (w − u), 0} − β ·max{w − u− (s− w), 0}.
Clearly this function does not satisﬁes the hypotheses of Proposition 2, but as it turns out it
is covered by Proposition 3. To see this ﬁrst observe that the second term can be written as
2α ·max{ s(θ)+u(θ)2 − w, 0} and similarly the last term is 2β ·max{w − s(θ)+u(θ)2 , 0}. That is
the inequity is given by deviations of w from the midpoint between s and u. Now for w below
the midpoint (θ high enough) the payoﬀ above is proportional to −[s(θ) + 1+αα u(θ)] so the
committee would reduce θ; the same goes at the midpoint, where the right derivative if V is
−u′ − β(u′ + s′) < 0; thus at the optimum w must be above the midpoint. But in that range
the committee's payoﬀ becomes proportional to s(θ)− 1−ββ u(θ), which is the case covered in
Proposition 3.
A parametric example
Going back to Proposition 2 it is instructive to see what happens in a parametric example. We
take V = (w−u)1−α(s−w)α with 0 < α < 1, s = θ, u = θ2. Here s(1) = u(1) so w ≤ u(1) and
the committee's choice is always interior. The example is instructive because the parameter
α has a natural interpretation as the degree of anonymity of the committee, since the larger
it is the less the committee cares about the rent w− u which the agent obtains out of getting
the job. Here s(θ) = w gives θmin(w) = w and from u(θ) = w we get θmax(w) =
√
w.
To solve the model start with the committee's choice given w. The committee maximizes
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(w − θ2)1−α(θ − w)α, whose solution is given by
θc(w;α) =
w(1− α) +√wα2 + w2α(1− α) + (1− α)2w2
2− α .
The principal chooses the wage to maximize s(θc(w;α))−w = θc(w;α)−w and the solution
is easily found to be
wp(α) =
√
α(2− α)− α(2− α)
2(1− α)2 .
We note for later that this increases from wp(0) = 0 to 0.25 as α goes up. The equilibrium θ





As α goes from zero to 1 this increases from zero to the ﬁrst best θfb = 1/2: the more detached
the committee is from the candidate the better the outcome.






increases in α, and as expected converges to the ﬁrst best surplus s(θfb) − u(θfb) as α → 1,
while it converges to zero as α→ 0.
Finally, the equilibrium payoﬀ of the selected candidate is
wp(α)− (θc(wp(α), α))2 = (1 + α)
√
α(2− α)− α(3− α)
2(1− α)2 .
As expected this goes to zero if α → 1: in that case θc(w) = √w = θmax(w) for all w - the
committee always leaves zero rent to the candidate. The more interesting fact is that the
candidate's payoﬀ goes to zero also for α→ 0; this is because when the committee gives little
weight to the principal's payoﬀ s − w the latter reacts by setting w very low (as we noted
wp(α) goes to zero with α) - so everyone ends up being worse oﬀ. As can be checked the the
candidate's payoﬀ is non-monotone, concave with an interior maximum (1/5 for the record).
4 Random selection
Could the principal do better without the committee by setting the wage and selecting a
candidate at random in the relevant pool? Precisely this would mean setting w optimally
to maximize Ews(θ) − w where Ew is the expectation with respect to the conditional of θ
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on [θmin(w), θmax(w)]. Without a closed form solution the question is hard to answer, so
we take a simple case to see how it might go . Speciﬁcally we take again V (w − u, s− w) =
(w−u)1−α(s−w)α, linear s(θ) = θ, quadratic u(θ) = θ2 and assume θ is distributed uniformly
in [0, 1].
Given w the expected θ on the relevant interval is the midpoint (θmin(w) + θmax(w))/2
for all w. In this case as we observed θmin(w) = w and θmax(w) =
√
w. Hence Ews(θ)− w =
(
√
w−w)/2 which is solved by wr = 1/4. Expected θ is the midpoint θr = 3/8 < θfb and the
principal's payoﬀ θr − wr = 1/8. This is the random selection benchmark.
From what we know about the delegation case it is to be expected that in the if α is small
enough the principal is better oﬀ without the committee, an vice versa for large enough α -
and same for welfare. The only question is what happens for intermediate values, and that
gives an interesting answer - which is easy to get since we know everything about delegation
under the current assumptions:
Proposition 4. There exist 0 < αl < 1/2 < αh < 1 such that: (i) for α < αl random
selection is better both for welfare s−u and for the principal; (ii) for α > αh delegation to the
committee is better for welfare and for the principal; (iii) for αl < α < αh random selection
is better for welfare but the principal prefers delegation to the committee.
Proof. The benchmark of random selection delivers θr = 3/8 with payoﬀ for the principal
1/8. Under delegation as we know the equilibrium θ increases from zero to ﬁrst best; it
equals θr at αh = 9/17 > 1/2 and thus it is closer to ﬁrst best than random selection
for α > αh. We also know that under delegation the principal's payoﬀ increases with α
from zero to s(θfb) − u(θfb) = 1/4; it equals the payoﬀ 1/8 of the random selection at
αl = (2
√
2 + 5)/17 < 1/2 and thus for α > αl the committee prefers committee partial
delegation to random selection.
The conclusion in the intermediate range is interesting: the distortion in the delegation
scenario is substantial - the committee's selection is further away from ﬁrst best than purely
random selection - but the principal is better oﬀ so he will choose to appoint the committee
(assuming of course that has a negligible cost).
5 Full delegation
We lastly investigate what happens if the principal delegates the committee to set the wage as
well. We call this one the full delegation case and refer to the previous section as the partial
delegation case. The ﬁrst result is the following:
Proposition 5. Assume the committee's preferences are described by V (w − u, s − w) with
V concave increasing in each argument with the same boundary conditions as in Proposition
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2: lim(V1/V2)w−u→0 =∞ and lim(V1/V2)s−w→0 = 0. With full delegation the committee will
select θ = θfb. If Vij > 0 then the principal is worse oﬀ than in the partial delegation case.
Proof. The assumptions on V ensure that the committee's optimum is characterized by the
ﬁrst order conditions −V1u′ + V2s′ = 0, V1 − V2 = 0 which give u′ = s′ that is θ = θfb . If
Vij > 0 then the principal must be worse oﬀ than in the partial delegation case because in that
case he could set w such that θc(w) = θfb - namely, since the committee's choice was given by
V1u
′ = V2s′, he could set w such that V1(w − u(θfb), s(θfb)− w) = V2(w − u(θfb), s(θfb)− w)
- but he did not.
Thus in this case - assuming Vij > 0 - full delegation maximizes welfare but it will not
be implemented. Welfare maximization is easy to understand: out of a larger s − u the
committee can choose w to increase both w−u and s−w thus getting a higher payoﬀ V . We
next consider the convex combination V = γ · (s− w) + (1− γ) · (w − u).
Proposition 6. Assume V = γ · (s − w) + (1 − γ) · (w − u). With full delegation candidate
θ = θfb is selected for all γ. If γ ≤ 1/2 then the principal is worse oﬀ than in partial delegation
(weakly if γ = 1/2), while if γ > 1/2 he obtains the same payoﬀ.
Proof. Since s−w and w−u are nonnegative for all feasible w, θ it is V ≤ max{γ, 1−γ}(s−u).
If γ < 1/2 this is (1− γ)(s− u) and is attained by setting θ = θfb and w = s(θfb); if γ > 1/2
it is attained with θfb and w = u(θfb); if γ = 1/2 then θfb and any u(θfb) ≤ w ≤ s(θfb) solve
the problem. The comparison with partial delegation is straightforward: when γ < 1/2 the
principal obtains 0 with full delegation and a positive payoﬀ with partial delegation; when
γ ≥ 1/2 he obtains s(θfb) − u(θfb) with partial delegation while with full delegation he gets
the same if γ > 1/2 and something between this and zero when γ = 1/2.
6 Conclusion
We have seen that a committee selecting a candidate given a wage set by a principal will
select a candidate with lower than ﬁrst best ability if it takes into account the candidate's
gratitude - except in the limit case where the ﬁrst best is the individual with highest ability
in the market, in which case a non distorted outcome may result. We observe that the weight
on gratitude depends on the closeness of the relationship between the committee and the
selected candidate after the selection procedure, so that the more the committee is detached
from the candidate the better. Anonymity, like that of the referees in academic publishing,
always leads to ﬁrst best selection since by construction the committee is only interested in
the principal's payoﬀ in that case. The ﬁrst message of the paper is that this is the best
practice which all selections should emulate. The other lesson we learn from the model is
that from the point of view of social welfare it would be a good idea not to separate the
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power to set the wage from the power to select the candidate. Since on the other hand the
principal - who is the one who will pay the selected candidate ultimately - is worse oﬀ under
full delegation this is a somewhat weak point to make from a practical point of view. The
right direction to follow seems to be anonymity of the committee, the more the better.
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